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       emarkable developments in robotics over the last years have led to a 
new “summer” of artificial intelligence (AI).1 Notably, machine learning and 
deep learning transform daily life. Humans increasingly rely on “external” 
intelligence without even realizing it.2 The military has also recognized the 
significant potential of AI.3 Security forces employ AI tools for information 
analysis and facial recognition, for instance. Yet, the interest goes further. 
Technologically advanced States, such as the United States, China, and Rus-
sia, have started to engage in an arms race regarding military applications of 
AI.4 Major research and development projects, often involving partnerships 
between defense ministries, private companies, and academia, are currently 
                                                                                                                      
1. VINCENT BOULANIN ET AL., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, STRATEGIC STABILITY 
AND NUCLEAR RISK 8 (2020), https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/artifi-
cial_intelligence_strategic_stability_and_nuclear_risk.pdf [hereinafter ARTIFICIAL INTELLI-
GENCE, STRATEGIC STABILITY AND NUCLEAR RISK]. 
2. For example, smartphones and social media are powered by deep learning, a specific 
type of machine learning technique. Other civilian applications of AI may be automatic 
image recognition as well as AI applications for commercial purposes. For an overview of 
some civilian applications, see, e.g., 9 Applications of Machine Learning from Day-to-Day Life, 
MEDIUM (July 31, 2017), https://medium.com/app-affairs/9-applications-of-machine-
learning-from-day-to-day-life-112a47a429d0. 
3. Paul D. Scharre, The Opportunity and Challenge of Autonomous Systems, in AUTONOMOUS 
SYSTEMS: ISSUES FOR DEFENSE POLICYMAKERS 3, 5–6 (Paul D. Scharre & Andrew P. Wil-
liams eds., 2015), https://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/capdev/capdev_02.pdf. 
See also Niklas Masuhr, AI in Military Enabling Applications, CSS ANALYSES IN SECURITY POL-
ICY (Oct. 2019), https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-
for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse251-EN.pdf. Despite a recent AI renaissance, it 
bears noting that AI applications have been used in the military domain since the 1960s, 
though in simpler forms. See, e.g., STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTEL-
LIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH (3d ed. 2014). 
4. Carl B. Frey & Michael Osborne, China Won’t Win the Race for AI Dominance, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS (June 19, 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-
19/china-wont-win-race-ai-dominance; Tania Rabesandratana, Europe Moves to Compete in 
Global AI Arms Race, 360 SCIENCE 474, 474–75 (2018); Michael C. Horowitz, The Algorithms 
of August, FOREIGN POLICY (Sept. 12, 2018), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/will-
the-united-states-lose-the-artificial-intelligence-arms-race/; Tom Simonite, For Superpowers, 
Artificial Intelligence Fuels New Global Arms Race, WIRED (Sept. 8, 2017), 
https://www.wired.com/story/for-superpowers-artificial-intelligence-fuels-new-global-
arms-race/; Edward M. Geist, It’s Already Too Late to Stop the AI Arms Race—We Must Manage 













underway.5 Given AI’s significant advantages, there is a strong tendency for 
increased autonomy in security affairs. This includes an unbroken trend to-
wards increased autonomy in relation to the military use of force against ob-
jects and persons.6 
States and legal scholars have started to debate if and how military appli-
cations of AI might be compatible with existing international law, in partic-
ular international humanitarian law (IHL—here synonymously used as the 
“law of armed conflict” or the “law of war”). Mandated by the UN General 
Assembly, the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies 
in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons has deliberated on this within 
the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) 
since 2016. In this context, several States have stressed the importance of 
legal reviews of weapons, means and methods of warfare according to Arti-
cle 36 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions7 (API) and 
customary international law.8 The legal review process, which assesses the 
legality of new weapons, would ensure that States do not employ AI-
                                                                                                                      
5. See, e.g., KELLEY M. SAYLER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45178, ARTIFICIAL INTELLI-
GENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 20–26 (Nov. 10, 2020).  
6. The United States and the United Kingdom have stated that they will keep “human 
judgment” and “human control” over such systems: “[a]utonomous . . . weapon systems 
shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of hu-
man judgment over the use of force” and “operation of weapons systems will always be 
under human control,” respectively. See U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 3000.09, 
Autonomy in Weapon Systems 13 (2012, incorporating Change 1, May 8, 2017) [hereinafter 
DoD Directive 3000.9]; UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, JDP 0-30.2, UN-
MANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 43, ¶ 4.18 (2017). Both terms (“human judgment” and “hu-
man control”) are flexible notions that may lay themselves open to broad or even contra-
dicting interpretations, however. Cf., e.g., Congressional Research Service, Defense Primer: U.S. 
Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (Dec. 1, 2019), https://fas.org/    
sgp/crs/natsec/IF11150.pdf; Killer Robots: UK Government Policy on Fully Autonomous Weapons, 
ARTICLE36 (Apr. 2013), http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Pol-
icy_Paper1.pdf. 
7. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 36, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter API]. 
8. Several delegations have stressed explicitly the relevance of legal reviews of weapons 
in respect to lethal autonomous weapons in the context of the CCW, such as Brazil, Canada, 
the European Union, Greece, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
For specific references to such statements, see Eric T. Jensen, The (Erroneous) Requirement for 
Human Judgment (and Error) in the Law of Armed Conflict, 96 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 













powered systems that do not comply with IHL. Scholarly work has echoed 
the relevance of legal reviews regarding increasing autonomy related to 
weapon systems and have started to identify arising challenges. It has been 
noticed that new technology “can in some cases make the process of con-
ducting an Article 36 review very difficult” and that this “might necessitate 
revising old legal concepts anew or pose new risks that may themselves re-
quire new methods of risk assessment.”9 In December 2019, the 33rd Inter-
national Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent also stated that “for 
legal reviews to be effective, States that develop or acquire new weapon tech-
nologies need to navigate [their] complexities.”10  
This article answers this call for further reflection and digs deeper into 
the issue. It first provides an overview of emerging AI technology and its 
military applications, termed “war algorithms.”11 As such, this analysis ap-
plies to any type of operational use of AI that falls under the obligation to 
be legally reviewed, including its use in cyber operations, which inherently 
leads to a focus on the use of AI in relation to the conduct of hostilities. The 
article goes on to survey the debate among States in diplomatic fora and 
existing academic literature to outline the different perspectives on the legal 
review in the context of autonomous systems. It further analyzes in detail 
the obligation under IHL to conduct a legal review of weapons, means or 
methods of warfare, as well as the related State practice concerning such 
reviews. The article finds that while legal reviews are critical to prevent the 
deployment of weapons and systems that are non-compliant with existing 
international law, the existing practice is not fully adequate for reviewing the 
legality of AI-powered systems.  
The article argues that States must adapt their legal reviews to the emerg-
ing AI technology. For AI systems that provide critical elements to human 
                                                                                                                      
9. VINCENT BOULANIN & MAAIKE VERBRUGGEN, ARTICLE 36 REVIEWS: DEALING 
WITH THE CHALLENGES POSED BY EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 6 (2017), 
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/article_36_report_1712.pdf [hereinaf-
ter ARTICLE 36 REVIEWS: DEALING WITH THE CHALLENGES]. 
10. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAR-
IAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS: RECOMMIT-
TING TO PROTECTION IN ARMED CONFLICT ON THE 70TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS 29 (2019) [hereinafter ICRC, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND 
THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS]. 
11. Dustin A. Lewis, Gabriella Blum & Naz K. Modirzadeh, War-Algorithm Accountabil-














operators for targeting decisions and systems that autonomously take related 
decisions, legal reviews must assess the compliance with additional rules, in 
particular targeting law under IHL. Yet AI applications pose significant chal-
lenges regarding their predictability and explainability. This predictability 
problem is first and foremost an operational and technical challenge that can 
be addressed by the technical process of verification and validation, a process 
that generally precedes legal reviews. This article argues that for military sys-
tems that embed AI, as the law is translated into technical specifications, 
technical and legal assessments ultimately conflate into one. States thus need 
to conduct legal reviews as part of the technical validation and verification 
process. While this requires defining and assessing new parameters regarding 
predictability, among other consequences, the article suggests that emerging 
guidelines on the development and use of AI by States and industry can pro-
vide elements for the development of new guidance for the legal review of 
AI-driven systems. The article concludes that legal reviews become even 
more important for AI technology than for traditional weapons. With in-
creased human reliance on AI, the legal review is the essential gatekeeper to 
its legal functioning. 
 
II. MILITARY AND WEAPONIZED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
 
AI can be described as a set of computational techniques that enables ma-
chines to solve complex and abstract problems that are naturally performed 
through human intelligence.12 It can provide a system with “cognitive capa-
bilities” to independently undertake functions such as observation, pro-
cessing natural language, or learning.13 Autonomy is therefore a constitutive 
                                                                                                                      
12. INTERNATIONAL PANEL ON THE REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS 
(IPRAW), FOCUS ON COMPUTATIONAL METHODS IN THE CONTEXT OF LAWS (2017), 
https://www.ipraw.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2017-11-10_iPRAW_Focus-On-
Report-2.pdf; Vincent Boulanin, Artificial Intelligence: A Primer, in 1 THE IMPACT OF ARTIFI-
CIAL INTELLIGENCE ON STRATEGIC STABILITY AND NUCLEAR RISK: EURO-ATLANTIC 
PERSPECTIVES 13, 13–14 (Vincent Boulanin ed., 2019), https://www.sipri.org/sites/de-
fault/files/2019-05/sipri1905-ai-strategic-stability-nuclear-risk.pdf [hereinafter IMPACT OF 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE]. 
13. Boulanin, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 12, at 13; PAUL SCHARRE & MICHAEL C. 















trait of AI.14 Yet, the current systems’ ability to know and act rests within 
predefined parameters that are set by human programmers. Current AI-
driven systems perform only specified tasks to produce a desired outcome, 
such as visual perception, speech recognition, or decision-making. Accord-
ingly, current AI techniques are called “narrow AI.” In contrast, it is not yet 
possible for an AI system to pursue general purposes in general contexts as 
humans do, which is called “General Artificial Intelligence (AGI).”15  
Current AI systems can perform both significantly worse and better than 
humans, depending on the task and context.16 Regarding object recognition, 
for instance, deep-learning networks that learn how to recognize patterns of 
pixels making up images can misclassify what they “see” if just minimal 
changes occur in the pixel patterns. For this reason, they can be easily de-
ceived through so-called “adversarial attacks.” A team at Tesla, for instance, 
showed several ways to easily fool the autonomously driving cars’ algo-
rithms.17 AI-based systems also still poorly perform for face-recognition, no-
tably when it comes to certain ethnic groups,18 and their reliance on software 
                                                                                                                      
14. Frank Sauer, Military Applications of AI: Nuclear Risk Redux, in IMPACT OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE, supra note 12, at 84. 
15. Ragnar Fjelland, Why General Artificial Intelligence Will Not Be Realized, HUMANITIES 
& SOCIAL SCIENCE COMMUNICATIONS (June 17, 2020), https://www.nature.com/arti-
cles/s41599-020-0494-4. See also Gideon Lewis-Kraus, The Great A.I. Awakening, NEW  
YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/maga-
zine/the-great-ai-awakening.html. 
16. M.L. CUMMINGS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE FUTURE OF WARFARE 8 
(2017).  
17. Furthermore, scientists from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have 
shown the potential of “adversarial attacks.” They demonstrated how reconnaissance sys-
tems based on deep learning can be easily led to misclassify objects, such as a turtle with a 
rifle. See, e.g., Will Knight, Military Artificial Intelligence Can Be Easily and Dangerously Fooled, 
MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/   
2019/10/21/132277/military-artificial-intelligence-can-be-easily-and-dangerously-fooled/. 
18. For example, AI has demonstrated poor performance in face-recognition of people 
with darker skin, which has recently led IBM, Amazon, and Microsoft to set self-imposed 
moratoriums on such technologies. See Karen Weise & Natasha Singer, Amazon Pauses Police 
Use of Its Facial Recognition Software, NEW YORK TIMES (June 10, 2020), https://www.ny-
times.com/2020/06/10/technology/amazon-facial-recognition-backlash.html; Jay Greene, 
Microsoft Won’t Sell Police its Facial-Recognition Technology, Following Similar Moves by Amazon and 














makes them particularly vulnerable to cyber-attacks.19 Yet, the advantages of 
AI for the conduct of military operations are undeniable for tasks where 
speediness of reaction is essential (such as cyber operations), or a vast 
amount of data needs to be managed. AI techniques particularly allow mili-
taries to undertake a wide range of tasks with more accuracy and effective-
ness than humans, notably surveillance operations through computer vi-
sion,20 fighter pilot training, and search and rescue operations.21  
Given these significant advantages, AI is increasingly used for military 
operations, especially in relation to targeting. Targeting is the engagement of 
an object or person with detrimental kinetic or non-kinetic effects. The U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) defines targeting as “the process of selecting 
and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, con-
sidering operational requirements and capabilities,” the purpose of which is 
to “integrate and synchronize fires into joint operations by utilizing available 
capabilities to generate a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target.”22 
Applied to targeting functions, AI may serve as a tool to “empower un-
manned systems to perform critical missions safely and with high degree of 
autonomy,” as the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) writes.23 The replacement of human operators by AI systems in 
targeting cycles may further allow greater speed in observing, orienting, de-
ciding, and acting, as well as increased accuracy for hitting a target, the ability 
                                                                                                                      
19. See Gheorghe Calopăreanu, Aspects of Employing Artificial Intelligence in the Fighting Area, 
10 ANNALS: SERIES ON MILITARY SCIENCE, Issue No. 2, at 31, 36 (2018).  
20. For example, the U.S. Project Maven attempted to create computer vision AI to 
analyze vast amount of surveillance footage. See David Herron, Project Maven to Deploy Com-
puter Algorithms to War Zone by Year’s End, TECH SPARX (July 20, 2017), https://tech-
sparx.com/blog/2017/07/project-maven.html. 
21. Robert W. Button, Artificial Intelligence and the Military, REAL CLEAR DEFENSE (Sept. 
7, 2017), https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/09/07/artificial_intelli-
gence_and_the_military_112240.html; Naveen Joshi, 4 Ways Global Defense Forces Use AI, 
FORBES (Aug. 26, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2018/08/26/4-
ways-the-global-defense-forces-are-using-ai/#37307f5503e4. 
22. See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, at I-1, I-6 (2013), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Joint_Chiefs-Joint_Target-
ing_20130131.pdf. 
23. AI Next Campaign, DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/ai-next-cam-













to maintain unaltered performance over time,24 and extended reach.25 Such 
potential has been recently demonstrated during simulations of a dogfight 
between two F-16 fighter jets, for instance, in which the human pilot lost 
against an AI-powered algorithm.26 
Autonomy in targeting is already a reality. Relatively simple rule-based 
control software undertakes targeting functions without human interven-
tion. This is the case for air-defense systems or missiles with autonomous 
modes. The U.S. Air Force CQM-121A Pave Tiger and the YGCM-121B 
Seek Spinner, both unmanned aerial vehicles with anti-radar munitions, for 
instance, constitute such autonomous weapons, yet lack AI.27 Distinguished 
from such systems that engage in the targeting decision themselves are AI 
tools that support the targeting cycle. AI-enabled intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR) systems provide prediction and identification, for 
instance. In this case, while the data provided by the algorithm is essential to 
reaching a targeting decision, the ultimate decision rests with the human op-
erator.28  
In diplomatic fora, notably the CCW, the debate has been almost exclu-
sively focused on a more advanced type of AI application for targeting, so-
called “Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems” (LAWS). The United States 
defines these systems as those that, once activated, “can select and engage 
                                                                                                                      
24. Scharre, supra note 3, at 3. On this issue, in the context of the Group of Govern-
mental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems meetings, Russia was of the view 
that LAWS “are capable of considerably reducing the negative consequences of the use of 
weapons related to operator’s errors, mental and physiological state, as well as ethical, reli-
gious or moral stance in the IHL context.” Russian Federation, Potential Opportunities and 
Limitation of Military Uses of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 4, U.N. Doc. 
CCW/GGE.1/2019/WP.1 (Mar. 15, 2019), https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/docu-
ments/Disarmament-fora/ccw/2019/gge/Documents/GGE.2-WP1.pdf. 
25. GREG L. ZACHARIAS, AUTONOMOUS HORIZONS: THE WAY FORWARD 8 (2019), 
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/b_0155_zacharias_auton-
omous_horizons.pdf. 
26. Patrick Tucker, An AI Just Beat a Human F-16 Pilot in a Dogfight—Again, DEFENSE 
ONE (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2020/08/ai-just-beat-hu-
man-f-16-pilot-dogfight-again/167872/.    
27. DEFENSE INNOVATION BOARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, AI PRINCIPLES: 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ETHICAL USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE BY THE DE-
PARTMENT OF DEFENSE 12 (2019), https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/20022 
04459/-1/-1/0/DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_SUPPORTING_DOCUMENT.PDF. 
28. As to how AI applications can help armed forces in reaching targeting decisions, 
see, e.g., Ashley Deeks, Coding the Law of Armed Conflict: First Steps, in THE LAW OF ARMED 













targets without further intervention by a human operator.”29 Disagreement 
exists on how to conceive the notion of autonomy.30 Yet, it is generally 
agreed that AI has not reached the stage of enabling a system to operate fully 
autonomously during the entire targeting phase, namely making its own de-
cisions as to whom to target and when to fire weapons.31 It is generally 
agreed that such systems do not yet exist.32 Some types of close-in weapons 
systems, such as the U.S. Phalanx, are able to detect and evaluate threats on 
their own, as well as track, engage, and destroy them.33 Yet, such systems are 
employed in very limited contexts and remain under real-time human super-
vision.34  
                                                                                                                      
29. DoD Directive 3000.9, supra note 6, at 13–14. Similarly, the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross defines LAWS as “[a]ny weapon system with autonomy in its critical 
functions. That is, a weapon system that can select (i.e. search for or detect, identify, track, 
select) and attack (i.e. use force against, neutralize, damage or destroy) targets without hu-
man intervention.” International Committee of the Red Cross, Views of the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on Autonomous Weapon System (Apr. 11, 2016), 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/B3834B2C62344053C1257F94
00491826/%24file/2016_LAWS+MX_CountryPaper_ICRC.pdf. See also Christof Heyns, 
(Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions), Report, ¶ 38,  U.N. 
Doc. HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9, 2013), https://undocs.org/A/HRC/23/47. For an overview of 
LAWS definitions, see Michael C. Horowitz, Why Words Matter: The Real World Consequences of 
Defining Autonomous Weapons Systems, 30 TEMPLE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 
JOURNAL 85, 86-87 (2016).  
30. Generally, autonomy refers to the ability of a machine to execute certain tasks with-
out human input, using interactions of computer programming with the environment. AR-
TIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, STRATEGIC STABILITY AND NUCLEAR RISK, supra note 1, at 13 
(quoting Andrew Williams, Defining Autonomy in Systems: Challenges and Solutions, in AUTONO-
MOUS SYSTEMS: ISSUES FOR DEFENCE POLICYMAKERS 27 (Andrew Williams & Paul Scharre 
eds., 2015), https://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/capdev/capdev_02.pdf. On 
autonomy and weapons systems, see generally John O. Birkeland, The Concept of Autonomy and 
the Changing Character of War, 5 OSLO LAW REVIEW 73, 86 (2018); PAUL SCHARRE & MI-
CHAEL C. HOROWITZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS (2015). 
On autonomy in targeting, see infra Part V. 
31. Michael C. Horowitz, The Ethics & Morality of Robotic Warfare: Assessing the Debate over 
Autonomous Weapons, 145 DAEDALUS 25, 27 (2016).  
32. See, e.g., Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications, 36 
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 1837, 1863 (2015) (stating that “[t]here is a nearly universal agree-
ment . . .that [LAWS] do not yet exist.”). 
33. Rajesh Uppal, Close-in Weapons Systems (CIWS) to Provide Last Chance Defence till Re-
placed by Railguns and Lasers, INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE, SECURITY & TECHNOLOGY (Aug. 
2, 2019), https://idstch.com/military/navy/close-in-weapons-system-ciws-to-provide-last-
chance-defence-till-replaced-by-railguns-and-lasers/.  













States’ interest in employing AI for managing military operations, most 
notably targeting cycles, is likely to increase as technologies continue to ad-
vance. Advances in machine learning and deep learning have led ministries 
of defense to direct their research and development (R&D) at increasing the 
autonomy of weapon systems through AI. The United States, China, Russia, 
the United Kingdom, France, Israel, and South Korea are investing consid-
erable resources in R&D projects to employ AI in autonomous targeting.35 
The United States established autonomy as one of the main pillars of its 
military development in its “Vision for Air Force Science and Technology 
2010-2030.”36 DARPA aims to increase autonomy in military applications 
and create “machines [that] are more than just tools that execute human-
programed rules or generalize from human-curated data set.” In other 
words, these machines are intended rather as “colleagues than . . . tools.”37 
China massively invests in new partnerships with private commercial entities 
and academic actors to “use advance commercial technology to serve the 
military.”38 China also rapidly progresses in automating weapons through AI, 
as illustrated by its recent development of cutting-edge drones.39 Russia es-
tablished close cooperation between the public and private sector,40 and in 
2012, it created an institution analogous to the U.S. DARPA to promote 
R&D in military technology.41 More recently, Russia identified AI as a means 
                                                                                                                      
35. FRANK SLIJPER, ALICE BECK & DAAN KAYSER, STATE OF AI: ARTIFICIAL INTEL-
LIGENCE, THE MILITARY, AND INCREASINGLY AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS (2019). 
36. WERNER J.A. DAHM, REPORT ON TECHNOLOGY HORIZONS: A VISION FOR AIR 
FORCE SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGY DURING 2010-2030, at iv (2010). 
37. AI Next Campaign, supra note 23. It is worth noting, that the U.S. Army has also set 
up “a campaign of learning to aggressively pursue an Artificial Intelligence and machine 
learning-enabled battlefield management system,” called “Project Convergence.” The pro-
ject is intended to transform the Army into “a Multi-Domain Force by 2035.” See Project 
Convergence, ARMY FUTURES COMMAND, https://armyfuturescommand.com/convergence/ 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2021). 
38. SLIJPER, BECK & KAYSER, supra note 35, at 13–15. 
39. GREGORY C. ALLEN, UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S AI STRATEGY: CLUES TO CHI-
NESE STRATEGIC THINKING ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
(2019), https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-Understa      
nding-Chinas-AI-Strategy-Gregory-C.-Allen-FINAL-2.15.19.pdf?mtime=20190215104041      
&focal=none. 
40. Samuel Bendett, Here’s How the Russian Military Is Organizing to Develop AI, DEFENSE 
ONE (July 20, 2018), https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/07/russian-militarys-ai-
development-roadmap/149900/. 














to control autonomous military systems.42 It also reportedly developed an 
autonomous drone that could “take off, accomplish its mission, and land 
without human interference.”43 
 
III. THE DIPLOMATIC AND LEGAL DEBATE 
 
Multilateral diplomacy and legal scholarship have started to address the rising 
challenges of increased autonomy related to targeting. Ethical and legal con-
cerns over autonomous systems that make decisions over life and death of 
humans have led to diplomatic initiatives and deliberations within the CCW. 
Since 2014 the CCW has started to dedicate working sessions on the topic, 
ultimately establishing a Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS that 
meets biannually. The Group of Governmental Experts’ purpose is to delve 
into critical questions related to the possible development and deployment 
of LAWS. To this end, States submit working papers, share their practice, 
and present proposals. While the Group of Governmental Experts summa-
rizes its discussions and proposes the way forward every year in a report, the 
debate on LAWS continues at the First Committee on Disarmament and 
International Security of the UN General Assembly.44  
The deliberations among States initially centered around whether to ban 
autonomous weapons. Only a few States took a clear stance that such a ban 
would be necessary. As of October 2019, within the First Committee, thirty 
States favored a preemptive ban.45 Notably, China expressed the desire to 
                                                                                                                      
42. Samuel Bendett, In AI, Russia Is Hustling to Catch Up, DEFENSE ONE (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/04/russia-races-forward-ai-development/1471 
78/.   
43. SLIJPER, BECK & KAYSER, supra note 35, at 17 (quoting Kyle Mizokami, This is Rus-
sia’s First Autonomous Strike Drone, POPULAR MECHANICS (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.pop-
ularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a26027921/russia-autonomous-strike-drone-okhot 
nik/). 
44. See, e.g., Meetings Coverage, General Assembly, First Committee Weighs Potential 
Risks of New Technologies as Members Exchange Views on How to Control Lethal Au-
tonomous Weapons, Cyberattacks, U.N. Meetings Coverage GA/DIS/3611 (Oct. 26, 
2018), https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/gadis3611.doc.htm. 
45. Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Cuba, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Holy See, Iraq, Jordan, 
Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, State of Palestine, Uganda, 
Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. Country Views on Killer Robots, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER RO-














negotiate and conclude a protocol to ban the use of fully autonomous LAWS 
without banning their development.46 The adoption of a legally binding ban 
of LAWS is not expected in the near future however, as Australia, France, 
Israel, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Turkey, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom have opposed the negotiation of such a treaty.47 
The debate on LAWS has sparked critical reflections on whether the cur-
rent international legal framework, in particular IHL, is suitable for regulat-
ing these new technologies and their use in wartime. Some States argue that 
IHL constitutes a comprehensive and sufficient framework and that further 
norms or regulations setting boundaries for the use of military AI systems 
are unnecessary.48 Russia and the United States are the main supporters of 
such a position, which has been termed an “apply and comply” or “wait-
and-see” approach.49 Other States argued the contrary, namely that this “can 
hardly solve, in a fundamental way, the concerns.”50 Others demonstrated 
their receptiveness for additional principles, guidelines, or codes of conduct 
for operating such systems.51 The proposition to adopt a respective code of 
                                                                                                                      
46. Elsa Kania, China’s Strategic Ambiguity and Shifting Approach to Lethal Autonomous 
Weapon Systems, LAWFARE (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-strategic-
ambiguity-and-shifting-approach-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems.    
47. Country Views on Killer Robots, supra note 45. Some of them, however, at least sup-
ported a politically binding instrument, such as France. Ray Acheson, New Law Needed Now, 
REACHING CRITICAL WILL 1, 2 (Aug. 30, 2018), https://reachingcriticalwill.org/im-
ages/documents/Disarmament-fora/ccw/2018/gge/reports/CCWR6.9.pdf.  
48. Country Views on Killer Robots, supra note 45.  
49. Rebecca Crootof, Regulating New Weapons Technology, in THE IMPACT OF EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGIES ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 4, 21 (Eric Talbot Jensen & Ronald T. 
P. Alcala eds., 2019) [hereinafter IMPACT OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES]. For a summary 
of the positions upheld during LAWS expert meetings, see Group of Government Experts 
of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW, Report of the 2018 Group of Governmental 
Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/3 
(Oct. 23, 2018), https://undocs.org/en/CCW/GGE.1/2018/3. 
50. China, Position Paper, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7 (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://undocs.org/en/CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.7.   
51. While States of the Non-Aligned Movement and of the African Group, plus Aus-
tria, Brazil and Mexico favor the negotiation of a legally binding instrument, States which 
support or at least are “open to discuss further” a politically binding instrument are Aus-
tralia, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sri Lanka, 
Sweden, and Switzerland. They rely on the argument that a legally binding instrument would 













conduct has not led to any concrete result yet.52 In this context, a group of 
experts independently met in 2019 to discuss practical, legal, ethical, and op-
erational considerations presented by LAWS with the goal of producing a 
list of “Guiding Principles for the Development and Use of LAWS” as a 
potential starting point towards good international practice.53 At the same 
time, States have started adopting guidance for the development and use of 
AI for security purposes.54 
Both States that argue that existing IHL is a sufficient legal framework 
for such new technologies and States that argue that additional rules are nec-
essary have stressed the importance of legal reviews of weapons, means and 
methods of warfare to ensure new technologies’ compliance with IHL. In-
deed, as will be discussed below, legal reviews serve as a bulwark against 
fielding systems that cannot comply with IHL. The United States, among 
others, has emphasized the relevance of legal reviews. It has proposed that 
States develop “best practices” to conduct legal reviews of autonomous 
weapon systems.55 Recently, Argentina proposed to produce a compendium 
of good practices of legal reviews, focusing on the acquisition phase.56 The 
                                                                                                                      
52. Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons System, Report of the 2019 Session of the Group of Governmental 
Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, 
¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2019/3 (Sept. 25, 2019), https://undocs.org/en/CCW/ 
GGE.1/2019/3 [hereinafter Report of the 2019 Session]. 
53. The Canberra Working Group, Guiding Principles for the Development and Use of LAWS: 
Version 1.0, E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.e-ir.info/2020/ 
04/15/guiding-principles-for-the-development-and-use-of-laws-version-1-0/. 
54. For example, the United States adopted ethical principles on AI in October 2019 
(on such guidance, see infra Part VIII). France also adopted its own AI strategy for the 
defense sector, to date the only one concerning the security sector to have been publicly 
released. See VINCENT BOULANIN ET AL., RESPONSIBLE MILITARY USE OF ARTIFICIAL IN-
TELLIGENCE: CAN THE EUROPEAN UNION LEAD THE WAY IN DEVELOPING BEST PRAC-
TICE? 8 (2020), https://sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-11/responsible_military_use_ 
of_artificial_intelligence.pdf (quoting FRENCH MINISTRY OF THE ARMED FORCES, L’INTEL-
LIGENCE ARTIFICIELLE AU SERVICE DE LA DÉFENSE: RAPPORT DE LA TASK FORCE IA [AR-
TIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AT THE SERVICE OF DEFENSE: REPORT OF THE AI TASK FORCE] 
(2019)). 
55. Michael W. Meier, Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS): Conducting a Compre-
hensive Legal Review, 30 TEMPLE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL 119, 123 
(2016). 
56. Argentina, Questionnaire on the Legal Review Mechanisms of New Weapons, 













Group of Governmental Experts ultimately concluded at its second session 
in 2019 that good practices in the conduct of the legal reviews of LAWS is 
one of the issues “that may benefit from additional clarification.”57 In De-
cember 2019, the 33rd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent stressed again the role and application of legal reviews to emerging 
technologies.58  
While the diplomatic debate has been rather uncritical towards the ap-
plication of legal reviews to AI systems, few legal practitioners and scholars 
have studied the issue in depth. Initial works have applied existing State prac-
tices to autonomous systems, thereby asserting that IHL has an appropriate 
mechanism to ensure compliance by new technologies.59 Boulanin and Ver-
bruggen, researchers at the Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
tute, have built on this to map existing practices and identify challenges re-
garding the legal reviews of emerging technologies. They concluded that for 
weapons that can operate autonomously through AI applications, the exist-
ing practice for conducting legal reviews would not be sufficient. AI systems 
would need to be checked differently than traditional weapons to ensure 
their compliance with international law.60 Other commentators in a blog se-
ries of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) specifically 
                                                                                                                      
2019), https://unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/52C72D09DCA60B8BC1258 
41E003579D8/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2019_WP.6.pdf.  
57. Report of the 2019 Session, supra note 52, ¶ 18.c.  
58. See ICRC, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CON-
TEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 10, at 34–35. Already in 2003, at the 28th Inter-
national Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, it was reaffirmed by consensus the 
need to ensure “the legality of new weapons under international law . . . in light of the rapid 
developments of weapons technology and in order to protect civilians from the indiscrimi-
nate effects of weapons and combatants from unnecessary suffering and prohibited weap-
ons.” See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS & INTERNATIONAL FEDERA-
TION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES,  28TH INTERNATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT 20, https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/as-
sets/files/other/icrc_002_1103.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2021). 
59. Meier, supra note 55. William H. Boothby, Highly Automated and Autonomous Technol-
ogies, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW IN WAR AND PEACE 137 (William H. Boothby 
ed., 2018) [hereinafter NEW TECHNOLOGIES]. 
60. VINCENT BOULANIN & MAAIKE VERBRUGGEN, STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL 
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE COMPENDIUM ON ARTICLE 36 REVIEWS 16 (2017), 
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/sipri_bp_1712_article_36_compen-













dedicated to LAWS underlined the value of legal reviews.61 This work echoes 
the importance given to legal reviews by States in the context of the CCW. 
It also sets the ground for assessing in detail how to conduct legal reviews 
of military AI systems in practice and examines intrinsic challenges related 
to this emerging technology. 
 
IV. THE LEGAL REVIEW OF WEAPONS, MEANS OR METHODS               
OF WARFARE 
 
Legal reviews arise out of IHL’s requirement for States to assess if new weap-
ons, means or methods of warfare are prohibited in some or all circum-
stances by international law.62 The purpose of legal reviews is to avert the 
deployment of weapons that have been banned or restricted by specific in-
ternational legal rules or are not capable of complying with primary rules 
regulating the conduct of hostilities. Hence, legal reviews are national tools 
to prevent violations of international law that might occur with the introduc-
tion and use of new weapons.63  
States parties to API are bound by the obligation to conduct legal reviews 
under Article 36. This obligation builds on other IHL provisions, notably 
the preamble of the 1868 Saint Petersburg Declaration relating to explosive 
                                                                                                                      
61. Netta Goussac, Safety Net or Tangled Web: Legal Reviews of AI in Weapons and War-
fighting, HUMANITARIAN LAW & POLICY (Apr. 18, 2019), https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-
policy/2019/04/18/safety-net-tangled-web-legal-reviews-ai-weapons-war-fighting/; 
Dustin A. Lewis, Legal Reviews of Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare Involving Artificial In-
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Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987). 
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projectiles64 and Article 1 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.65 In 
addition, the Hague Convention IV Regulations and API affirm that the 
right of belligerents to choose and adopt means and methods of warfare “is 
not unlimited.”66 This implies a duty of care to assess the legality of weapons 
being developed and intended to be used.67 The obligation to conduct legal 
reviews in API is formulated in general and vague terms. Article 36 states 
that: 
 
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, 
means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obliga-
tion to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circum-
stances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international 
law applicable to the High Contracting Party.68 
 
                                                                                                                      
64. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 
400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, 18 MARTENS NOU-
VEAU RECUEIL (ser. 1) 474 [hereinafter 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration]. 
65. William H. Boothby, Regulating New Weapon Technologies, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES, 
supra note 59, at 16, 17. See also ICRC GUIDE, supra note 63, at 4. According to the 1868 St. 
Petersburg Declaration,   
 
the Contracting or Acceding Parties reserve to themselves to come hereafter to an under-
standing whenever a precise proposition shall be drawn up in view of future improvements 
which science may effect in the armament of troops, in order to maintain the principles 
which they have established, and to conciliate the necessities of war with the laws of hu-
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1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 64. Article 1 common to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions provides, “[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to en-
sure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.” See, e.g., Convention (I) 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces 
in the Field art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31. On Common Article 
1, see also TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
OPERATIONS 153 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013). 
66. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Con-
vention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 22, Oct. 18, 1907, 
36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]; API, supra note 7, art. 35(1). 
67. P.J. Blount, The Preoperational Legal Review of Cyber Capabilities: Ensuring the Legality of 
Cyber Weapons, 39 NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW 214 (2012). 













Whether Article 36 has attained customary nature remains debated.69 
Yet, States not party to API, such as the United States and Israel, have insti-
tutionalized legal reviews. The U.S. practice even preceded the adoption of 
API. In any case, a narrower obligation exists under customary law imposing 
a responsibility on States to ensure at least that means of warfare to be ac-
quired or used are compliant with IHL.70 Article 36 and the related custom-
ary norm are silent regarding the procedures to be followed, the conse-
quences of the review’s findings, and which actor within a State must con-
duct legal reviews.71 Accordingly, how to conduct legal reviews is mostly de-
fined by national regulations, policy, and practice.72 The United States and 
the United Kingdom are leading in this regard. They, as well as Australia, 
Norway, and Sweden, are among the few States that have shared their prac-
tice with others.73 To support the execution of legal reviews, the ICRC pub-
lished in 2006 “A Guide to the Legal Review of Weapons, Means and 
                                                                                                                      
69. See Kenneth Anderson, Daniel Reisner & Matthew C. Waxman, Adapting the Law of 
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70. See, e.g., TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 65, at 154. 
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(2d ed. 2016). 
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73. Australia, Sweden, and Norway, for example, have shared their practice in the con-
text of the Group of Government Experts on LAWS. See, e.g., Australia, The Australian 
Article 36 Review Process, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.2/2018/WP.6 (Aug. 30, 2018), 
https://www.unog.ch/80256edd006b8954/(httpassets)/46ca9dabe945fdf9c12582fe00380
420/$file/2018_gge+laws_august_working+paper_australia.pdf [hereinafter Australian Ar-
ticle 36 Review Process]. In general, twenty States are known to have in place procedures 
to conduct the legal review, including Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. Some States, however, tend not to disclose their 
practice as it is deemed to be sensitive information with respect to national security. See 
ICRC GUIDE, supra note 63, at 5 n.8; see also Isabelle Daoust, Robin Coupland & Rikke 
Ishoey, New Wars, New Weapons? The Obligation of States to Assess the Legality of Means and Meth-













Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of Additional Pro-
tocol I of 1977” (ICRC Guide).74 
While the treaty text of Article 36 is not specific, State practice of legal 
reviews entails certain generalities. Weapons, means and methods of warfare 
must be assessed in light of the obligations under API, as well as “any other 
rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party” according to Arti-
cle 36 API.75 The ICRC Guide explains that the reviewer should first assess 
the existence of specific treaty or customary law provisions outlawing the 
weapon under review or certain uses thereof.76 A specific ban or restriction 
of the use of a weapon, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention’s prohi-
bition on the use of chemical weapons,77 makes any further analysis irrele-
vant. If no such rules exist, the weapon should be evaluated in light of the 
fundamental principles of IHL regulating the conduct of hostilities. The vast 
majority of commentators share the view that there are three relevant prin-
ciples: (1) the prohibition of using “projectiles and material and methods of 
warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injuries or unnecessary suffering” 
of Article 35(2) API78 and Article 23(e) of the Hague Regulations;79 (2) the 
prohibition of employing weapons that—because of their nature—cannot 
discriminate between military targets and civilians or civilian objects, or be 
used in a discriminate manner as required by Articles 48 and 51 API;80 and 
(3) the prohibition of using weapons that cause widespread, long term and 
severe damage to the natural environment under Articles 35(3) and 55 API.81 
On the latter principle, disagreement exists as to whether the rule is relevant 
to every State as a matter of customary law or binds only States party to API 
as a matter of treaty law.82 
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Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction art. 1(b), Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 
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78. API, supra note 7, art. 35(2). 
79. Hague Regulations, supra note 66, art. 23(e). 
80. API, supra note 7, arts. 48, 51. 
81. Id. arts. 35(3), 55. 
82. According to the ICRC Guide on Article 36, for instance, the rule reflects customary 
law. See ICRC GUIDE, supra note 63, at 15–16; Rule 45. Causing Serious Damage to the Natural 
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There are further divergent views regarding the applicable normative 
framework that serves as the reference point for legal reviews. First, it is 
interesting to note that the ICRC Guide includes the principle of propor-
tionality, i.e., the prohibition of an attack that may be expected to result in 
excessive civilian harm (deaths, injuries, or damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof) compared to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated, among the relevant principles that a legal review should con-
sider. This principle, however, is designed to guide actual conduct on the 
battlefield. Its application relies on a concrete and specific evaluation made 
by soldiers or commanders in light of the existing circumstances. Therefore, 
it is hardly suited as a parameter for legal review. Relevant for the legal review 
is the weapon’s ability to discriminate between lawful and unlawful targets in 
order to allow its future user to comply with the proportionality principle.83 
Second, it is debated whether legal reviews should consider the weapons’ 
compliance with international human rights law. Only a few States have re-
ported they consider this when assessing weapons that are likely to be em-
ployed by armed forces in law enforcement operations.84 Third, a question 
remains over the relevance of the “principles of humanity” and the “dictates 
of public conscience”—the so-called Martens Clause.85 The ICRC Guide ar-
gues that a weapon that is not prohibited or restricted by any specific rule of 
international law would nonetheless be unlawful if its use would conflict with 
the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.86 Most 
commentators dismiss the Martens Clause as an irrelevant parameter because 
the principle does not provide normative content on its own.87 With respect 
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86. ICRC GUIDE, supra note 63, at 17. 
87. See, e.g., BOOTHBY, supra note 71, at 351 (quoting YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT 
OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 9 (2d ed. 2012);  
Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE HANDBOOK OF IN-













to State practice, only Australia is known to take it into consideration, 
whereas some States simply “keep it in mind” during legal reviews.88 
When conducting a legal review, States need to consider the characteris-
tics of the given weapon. Reviewers start the analysis by examining how the 
weapon operates (such as technical specifications, functionality, historical 
weapons use, extant order of battle, lethal characteristics, and accuracy) as 
well as weapons data (such as data capture points, data interpretation, and 
application of data to specifications).89 Unless it is clear that the weapon can-
not comply with IHL in any context or circumstance, they then need to as-
sess how and where the weapon is expected to be used and the “reasonably 
anticipated effects of employment.”90 In other words, the weapon’s charac-
teristics must be analyzed in light of the methods according to which the 
weapon is intended to be used as well as the intended context.91 This is nec-
essary as the IHL principles relevant to legal reviews are highly context-de-
pendent, and compliance therewith depends on the environment and cir-
cumstances when deployed. Assessing the weapon in light of its expected 
use allows the reviewer to determine whether the weapon can be lawfully 
used in a specific setting and/or in combination with certain methods; total 
or partial restrictions on its use may result.92  
Yet, there is a nuance to this. Article 36 API requires evaluation of the 
legality of the weapon in “all or some circumstances,”93 implying that review-
ers must explore all circumstances in which the weapon’s use could be un-
lawful. Regarding the principle of distinction, for instance, a weapon that is 
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partment of the Air Force, AFI51-401, The Law of War Part 2 (2018) [hereinafter AFI51-
401]. 
90. AFI51-401, supra note 89, ¶ 6.1.1. 
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TERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, EXPERT MEETING: AUTONOMOUS 
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92. ICRC GUIDE, supra note 63, at 10. 













not indiscriminate in itself would be considered unlawful if intended to be 
used in an indiscriminate manner.94 There is a limit to this, however. The 
ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols notes that States only need to 
determine “whether the employment of a weapon for its normal or expected use would be 
prohibited under some or all circumstances. [It] is not required to foresee or analyze all 
possible misuses of a weapon, for almost any weapon can be misused in ways that would 
be prohibited.”95 Drawing on this, the Commentary concludes that the “obligation 
only concerns the normal use of the weapon as seen at the time of the evaluation.” 96 Thus, 
those in charge of the review must have a clear understanding of the tech-
nology and sufficient information on the environment and circumstances in 
which the weapon will be deployed.97 Therefore, the functioning and effects 
of the weapons, as well as their use, must be predictable.98  
 
V. ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH TARGETING LAW  
 
While fully autonomous weapon systems are not yet a reality, there is a trend 
towards increasing use of AI for, or in relation to, targeting tasks. Concep-
tually, autonomy in weapon systems can be categorized according to three 
different traits, namely (1) the human-machine command-and-control rela-
tionship; (2) the sophistication of the machine’s decision-making process; 
and (3) the types of decisions or functions being made autonomous. Accord-
ing to the first trait, systems can be classified based on whether they receive 
inputs by a human operator to perform their functions in (a) “human-in-the-
loop” of the targeting decision, referring to systems that select targets and 
deliver force upon human command; (b) “human-on-the-loop,” capable of 
selecting targets and delivering force without human interaction but remain 
under the oversight of humans so that humans retain the power to override 
the machine’s action; and (c) “human-out-of-the-loop,” which refers to 
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systems that select targets and deliver force autonomously without humans 
being able to intervene during the process.99  
The major difference between manned systems (“human-in-the-loop”) 
and autonomous systems (“human-on-the-loop” and “human-out-of-the-
loop”) concerns the decision-making process in the targeting cycle. In the 
most extreme case, it is the system itself that takes targeting decisions based 
on its observations, perceptions, and evaluations rather than human opera-
tors. This is crucial for reviewing the legality of AI systems. For traditional 
weapons, it is sufficient that the legal review assesses the weapon’s technical 
features, the environment in which it is intended to be deployed, and the 
intended use. The actual use of the weapon is put in the hands of an operator, 
who is responsible for ensuring that the IHL rules governing targeting are 
respected. With AI systems operating autonomously, the role typically per-
formed by the weapon (i.e., releasing force) and that performed by the hu-
man operator (i.e., decision-making on the use of force) merge into one 
unique system. Accordingly, AI-driven weapon systems that conduct target-
ing decisions need to apply and comply with the entire spectrum of targeting 
law.100 
Targeting law refers to those rules under IHL that determine who and 
what can be targeted in an armed conflict and how. This is also referred to 
as the rules governing the conduct of hostilities or “Hague Law.”101 Target-
ing law encompasses three core IHL principles. First, the principle of dis-
tinction affirms that parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish be-
tween civilians and civilian objects, on the one hand, and legitimate targets 
(including military objectives), on the other.102 Second, the principle of 
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100. See, similarly, Boothby, Highly Automated and Autonomous Technologies, supra note 59, 
at 146. 
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proportionality prohibits attacks “which may be expected to cause incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combi-
nation thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and di-
rect military advantage anticipated.”103 Third, the principle of precaution re-
quires that parties to the conflict take “all feasible precautions . . . to avoid, 
and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians 
and damage to civilian objects.”104  
For legal reviews of weaponized AI, this implies that the system’s com-
pliance with the entire range of targeting law must be considered. In addition 
to the principles already assessed for traditional weapons, as discussed above, 
the legal review needs to consider the AI system’s ability to respect the prin-
ciple of proportionality, the ability to recognize if a person is hors de combat, 
if he or she has surrendered or is taking direct part in hostilities, and the 
ability to adopt precautionary measures as required under Article 57 API and 
customary law, or refer up to those supervising the system and/or planning 
the attack for them to take the necessary precautionary steps.105  
This also applies to AI systems that inform humans’ decision-making 
related to targeting or otherwise qualify as means of warfare, although there 
are limitations. Such systems would need to comply with those rules of tar-
geting law that are relevant to the functions they are entrusted with. For in-
stance, ISR would need to be assessed in light of the principle of distinction. 
For instance, it would need to be checked to determine if it can properly 
report that a person is hors de combat. While the system would not need to be 
able to conduct a proportionality assessment itself, it would need to be able 
to provide the relevant and correct information for assessing the proportion-
ality of an attack and deciding on feasible precautionary measures.  
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104. API, supra note 7, art. 57(2)(a)–(c); see also Rule 15. Precautions in Attack, ICRC, 
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If the AI system will be used for operations governed by international 
human rights law, the legal review also needs to consider the system’s com-
pliance with the law enforcement paradigm for the use of force. Force can 
be used only to pursue the legitimate aim of maintaining or restoring public 
security and law and order.106 According to the principle of absolute neces-
sity, the use of force must be the last resort. This further implies that only 
the level of force proportionate to the threat can be used (principle of pro-
portionality) and requires balancing the risk deriving from the individual pos-
ing the threat with the potential harm that the use of force may cause to the 
individual himself and bystanders.107 
There are procedural consequences arising from the necessity to assess 
the system’s compliance with targeting law and other potentially applicable 
law. First and foremost, the assessment of an AI system’s compliance with 
targeting law starts during the research and development phase. This is not 
something peculiar to AI systems. Article 36 API explicitly states that a new 
weapon’s legality shall be duly considered during its study and develop-
ment.108 However, for AI systems, this acquires a specific meaning. With 
traditional weapons, IHL rules operate as external parameters to guide hu-
man behavior, whereas, with AI systems, they become part of the system 
itself.109 Accordingly, IHL needs to be programmed into the system or 
“taught” to the system to enable its compliance with IHL’s rules. 
To this end, developers need to introduce targeting law into the AI sys-
tem by translating law into standards that an algorithm can understand. They 
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also need to provide proper data so that the system “learns” relevant IHL 
rules correctly. This assumes that it is possible to translate the applicable 
international law into the digital sphere. Indeed, lawyers recognize that there 
is “an increasing need for law in algorithmic forms.”110 Its technical feasibility 
is not yet guaranteed, however. The main challenges are the translation of 
the nature of the law into the algorithm’s language and the associated risks 
of unintended consequences.  
As AI systems operate (and learn) based on the data they receive, data 
becomes central in developing the system and determining how it will oper-
ate. Experts will need to ensure that the system is trained with appropriate 
data or, if the system collects data and learns autonomously, programmed 
such that it will collect only appropriate data and properly use it. This means 
that the system needs to be trained with a focus on the environment in which 
it is to be deployed and in circumstances that are representative of that en-
vironment.111 If a machine learning system entrusted with recognizing legit-
imate targets is trained only on people of a certain nationality or ethnicity, 
the system may associate that nationality or ethnicity with being an enemy 
and thereby possibly confuse civilians or persons taking no direct part in 
hostilities with legitimate targets, for instance.  
With data becoming the key determinant of an AI system’s output, it 
follows that selection and revision of such data need to be at the heart of the 
legal review of an AI system. As a result, legal advisers with experience in 
conducting legal reviews must engage during the design and development 
phase to support computer scientists and engineers in developing and pro-
gramming systems that conform to relevant legal principles.112 Their legal 
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knowledge would contribute to transforming relevant legal parameters into 
understandable standards and selecting representative data to allow the sys-
tem to learn IHL correctly.113 Once data is fed into the system, legal advisers 
could also evaluate the results from a legal standpoint by taking part in the 
testing process. The technical expertise, combined with the legal expertise, 
would ultimately help ensure that the system performs safely, free from bi-
ases, and lawfully.114 This process can be equated to an “anticipated” legal 
review, which, rather than being carried out on the system as a final product, 
has mostly data as its object.  
Accordingly, when comparing the legal review of traditional weapons 
with the legal review of AI-driven or -supported systems, the first differences 
are that targeting law must be considered, the legal review must be conducted 
at an earlier stage in the development process of the system, and the appro-
priateness of data needs to be considered. This, however, still builds on the 
assumption that the system’s behavior at the time of the legal review will be 
the same after the legal review, i.e., the behavior does not evolve in ways that 
are inconsistent with original expectations. 
 
VI. THE PREDICTABILITY PROBLEM 
 
When humans operate traditional weapons, the weapon’s anticipated use is 
based on expectations of the operator’s behavior in combat. This depends 
to a large extent on the operator’s capacities, training, and experience. This 
is also guided by standard operating procedures (SOPs), rules of engagement 
(ROE), orders, and other regulations and administrative measures concern-
ing the operator’s decision-making. During a legal review of a weapon, these 
elements must be taken into account in a general and abstract manner. Fu-
ture human behavior can be estimated based on prior experience with hu-
mans in battle. While this does not allow conclusions with full certainty, it 
does allow certain levels of confidence. In addition, the legal reviewer knows 
that the person operating the weapon will have full responsibility and ac-
countability over the weapon’s use, as every combatant is bound to apply 
IHL. This ensures a high level of predictability of the future use of the 
                                                                                                                      
at the Design Table for Lethal Autonomous Weapons, and We Can Start Now, 228 MILITARY LAW 
REVIEW 89 (2020). 
113. Questions would encompass, for example, whether the data provided are enough 
to allow the algorithm to recognize that a person is hors de combat, a combatant, or a civilian 
taking direct part in hostilities.  












weapon. For AI systems, this is different. The nature of AI applications in-
troduces inherent uncertainty as to how systems will behave once deployed 
and respond to changing and complex environments. Their unpredictability 
is of a different nature and degree depending on the AI techniques em-
ployed, namely hand-coded programming or machine learning. This techno-
logical distinction is relevant for adapting legal reviews to AI systems. 
 
A. Hand-coded Programming 
 
The first and most traditional approach to AI is hand-coded programming.115 
This approach relies on the elaboration by a programmer of a model of the 
world, including the rules of logic governing the relationships therein, which 
is then crafted into the system to allow it to operate autonomously.116 Pro-
grammers are required to research how the world works and create a model 
of the universe that describes the environment where the system is intended 
to be employed. Because the model, or source code, is crafted by human 
programmers, the system’s inner functioning is readable and understandable 
by humans. Accordingly, by providing a system with certain inputs, it is pos-
sible to observe the system’s response and understand what process the sys-
tem has followed to reach a specific outcome.117  
A major limitation is that the handcrafted approach is only suited if the 
operational environment can be reduced to clear mathematical rules. Armed 
conflicts are typically subject to constant changes and are not predictable. 
The process of transforming this operational environment into the code can 
therefore be extremely challenging, if not impossible.118 This has the conse-
quence that handcrafted AI is only operationalizable in limited scenarios of 
armed conflicts. Currently, such systems have been deployed to undertake 
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116. Boulanin, Artificial Intelligence, supra note 12, at 19. 
117. AI Next Campaign, supra note 23. 
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military tasks underwater, which represent uncluttered and highly predictable 
scenarios.119  
For legal reviews, the consequence is that a reviewer can assess the sys-
tem’s legality with regard to the specific settings in which it has been tested. 
Because handcrafted systems operate under a rigid framework of parameters 
crafted into it, a reviewer can rely on the fact that the system’s performance 
as observed during the review would remain unchanged once deployed and 
subjected to similar inputs in the real world. In addition, handcrafted sys-
tems’ suitability for relatively simple environments makes it easier to repro-
duce such environments and makes testing less cumbersome because of the 
limited set of inputs characterizing such environments. By testing the system 
in the context of its end-task, the reviewer can gain direct and precise evi-
dence of the system’s lawful or unlawful functioning in those specific set-
tings.120  
Yet, it remains impossible to test a system for every possible input it 
could face at the operational stage. Therefore only a limited number of out-
comes could ever be observed and evaluated.121 Generally speaking, for in-
puts that have not been tested, the AI system remains unpredictable and 
likely to fail if confronted with situations that differ from those that have 
been verified.122 This is often called “brittleness.”123 Since a legal review 
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cannot test and ensure the legality of the weapons’ functioning in such cir-
cumstances, the consequence of the legal review would be to impose clear 
limitations on the weapon’s deployment. Concretely, this would mean to 
specify that the weapons’ use would only be possible within the tested con-
text or to prescribe a certain behavior in conformity with IHL, such as with-
holding kinetic effects against a person or object when facing untested in-
puts. Indeed, any action outside such a framework could not have been fore-
seen and thus potentially illegal. 
 
B. Machine Learning 
 
The second type of AI is machine learning. Machine learning refers to a pro-
cess that allows a system to learn by “discover[ing] correlations between var-
iables in a dataset, often to make predictions or estimates of some out-
come.”124 Through machine learning, a system is “trained” using large 
amounts of data,125 from which it identifies correlations, builds a representa-
tion of the world, and ultimately learns how to perform a task.126 Given the 
system’s ability to learn for itself, it does not require explicit programming.127 
Instead, those who develop the system need to create a structure that allows 
the system to learn and adapt to changing situations.128 They also need to 
provide the algorithm with a great amount of properly selected data con-
cerning the operating environment.  
Learning capabilities imply that, contrary to handcrafted systems, the sys-
tem changes “its structure, program, or data (based on its inputs or in re-
sponse to external information) in such a manner that its expected future 
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performance improves.”129 As an example, if employed in conflict settings, 
a machine learning system may develop its own criteria to apply a set of rules 
through observations made on the battlefield.130 The learning process may 
occur in different manners: supervised learning, unsupervised learning, and 
reinforcement learning. In supervised learning, the system is trained through 
a combination of input instances and output labels and then trained to gen-
eralize a function. Through unsupervised learning, the system is provided 
only with inputs, and it finds structures and features in the data. In reinforce-
ment learning, the learning process occurs through trial and error. The future 
action is chosen either because it maximizes a future reward131 or because 
the system is seeking to learn something new.132 Such learning processes can 
occur either offline or online. In the former case, the algorithm is trained 
while being developed. In the latter, the system learns—or keeps learning—
during the deployment phase and adapts to the environment.133 Due to these 
technical features, machine learning systems are well-suited to operate in 
complex scenarios where hand-coded programming would fail. In the mili-
tary domain, machine learning is already employed to perform target recog-
nition tasks, for instance.134  
Machine learning systems’ increased flexibility and autonomy at the op-
erational stage lead to major challenges for their legal assessment, however. 
The first problem derives from machine learning’s reliance on training data 
to learn. This has been paraphrased as “the intelligence is in the data, not the 
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algorithm.”135 As mentioned above, the systems learn and operate based on 
data. Therefore, it is essential that data be representative of the reality where 
the system is intended to operate to avert unexpected bias or serious flaws 
in the system’s functioning.136 In addition, because of the complex scenarios 
where these systems are typically employed, the amount of inputs they could 
face is exponentially higher than that faced by handcrafted systems. Since 
these inputs can be potential sources for new learning and change the sys-
tem’s operating parameters, this would cause greater uncertainty as to what 
the system would learn and how it would react to inputs.  
The other challenge is directly linked to how machine learning systems 
reach their conclusions given certain inputs, also known as the “black box” 
or opacity problem. Machine learning algorithms, notably those relying on 
deep learning artificial neural networks, operate like a “black box” in the 
sense that while inputs and outputs of their functioning are observable, the 
inner process by which it reaches a specific outcome cannot be decon-
structed and understood.137 This means that the system lacks the ability to 
give reasons for its estimations or decisions—it lacks explainability.138 When 
a system’s learning process is limited to the offline phase, it will no longer 
change once a military makes the system operational. Although this might 
represent an advantage in terms of the foreseeability of a future system’s 
behaviors, it does not necessarily imply that the system acts deterministically, 
i.e., produces the same outputs if subjected to the same inputs.139 Yet even 
when deterministic AI systems are concerned, predictability remains limited. 
It would be unrealistic to expect that such systems receive exactly the same 
inputs they received during the pre-deployment assessment in real-life 
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situations.140 As illustrated by examples with adversarial attacks, very small 
changes in the inputs can lead to drastic changes in the outputs despite the 
model’s deterministic nature.141 This challenge is exacerbated for online ma-
chine learning. Although such systems can be subjected to specific inputs 
during a test, it remains impossible to generalize from the observed input-
output correlations and foresee how the system would react when con-
fronted with similar inputs in the real world.142 In other words, depending 
on what they learn during the operational phase and environmental condi-
tions, non-deterministic algorithms can produce different outputs even 
when subjected to identical inputs.143  
The complexity of such models highlights the tradeoff between auton-
omy and predictability. In practical terms, full predictability will not be an 
achievable state. It follows that such systems would never pass the legal re-
view if full predictability is set as a precondition for an AI system’s compli-
ance with IHL.144 Setting such a bar would also require more than what is 
expected when humans are in the targeting decision-making loop. Members 
of the armed forces are entrusted with targeting tasks and assessments even 
if they may behave unexpectedly and/or contrary to what has been ordered 
or is legally required. Yet, commanders still deploy them. For AI systems, 
rather than setting an unachievable standard, it is more realistic to accept that 
a certain degree of unpredictability is an intrinsic trait thereof. Indeed, the 
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use of AI may transform IHL’s standards from the “reasonableness” associ-
ated with human decision-making towards probabilistic levels of “cer-
tainty.”145  
For legal reviews, this means that different levels of predictability could 
be determined depending on the function attributed to the system. Notably, 
if it is to undertake critical functions related to targeting—and on the envi-
ronment in which it is to be deployed—the more critical the tasks, the higher 
the level of predictability that needs to be satisfied. For instance, a system 
performing targeting functions would need to satisfy a very high level of 
confidence regarding the lawfulness of a target before being able to fire, even 
if teamed with a human operator.146 The level of acceptable predictability set 
for each type of system-scenario would then become the parameter against 
which to assess the algorithm as a precondition to passing the legal review. 
The alternative would be to deploy the system in very limited operational 
circumstances, thus limiting its potential, or setting some safety mitigations, 
which likewise might limit its functions to non-critical ones.147 Given such 
tradeoffs, it is crucial not to undermine existing standards under IHL. Yet, 
from a practical perspective, evaluating if the given standards are met by an 
AI system is first and foremost a technical issue. 
 
VII. CONGRUENCE OF VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION WITH THE    
LEGAL REVIEW 
 
After a new weapon or weapon system is developed, it needs to undergo 
technical testing and approval before it can be legally reviewed and eventually 
deployed. This is accomplished through the process of “verification and val-
idation” (V&V). One of the best-established V&V processes for weapons is 
that of the U.S. DoD. V&V is a technical process involving different exper-
tise, including engineering, mathematics, and computer science, that leads to 
technical certification of the system.148 “Verification” consists of 
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mathematically “determining that [a system] accurately represents the devel-
oper’s conceptual description and specifications”149 and allows developers to 
evaluate “the extent to which [the system has] been developed using sound 
and established software-engineering techniques.”150 It is applied at each 
stage of the life cycle management process to ensure that the inputs and 
outputs are implemented accurately and properly.151 Verification basically 
answers the question: does the system do what the programmers said? In 
other words, it investigates whether the system has been built in the right 
manner.152 “Validation” is the process of determining the extent to which 
the system is an accurate representation of the real world from the perspec-
tive of its intended use and assuring that the system meets the needs of those 
who will utilize it.153 Informally speaking, it means asking whether the right 
model has been built.154  
V&V is typically combined with an additional technical process consist-
ing of weapons “testing and evaluation” (T&E), usually occurring at an ear-
lier stage. T&E is the primary means to ensure that the system will actually 
                                                                                                                      
completely on such results. Telephone Interview with Benjamin Schumeg, Tarek Abulmagd, 
Adam Hilburn, Adam Hoxha, Newman Hsiao, Ryan Olsen, Katy Perez, Gagan Singh, and 
Carl Valianti, United States Army Futures Command, Software Qualification Branch (Nov. 
5, 2020). 
149. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, TEST AND EVALUATION MANAGEMENT GUIDE 
220 (6th ed. 2012), https://www.dau.edu/tools/Lists/DAUTools/Attachments/148/Test 
%20and%20Evaluation%20Management%20Guide,%20December%202012,%206th%20 
Edition%20-v1.pdf [hereinafter TEST AND EVALUATION MANAGEMENT GUIDE]. 
150. HEADQUARTERS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 5-11, VERIFICA-
TION, VALIDATION, AND ACCREDITATION OF ARMY MODELS AND SIMULATIONS ¶ 3-2 at 
24 (1999), https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/p5_11.pdf 
[hereinafter VERIFICATION, VALIDATION, AND ACCREDITATION OF ARMY MODELS AND 
SIMULATIONS]. 
151. Fei Liu, Ming Yang & Peng Shi, Verification and Validation of Fuzzy Rules-Based Hu-
man Behavior Models, in 7TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SYSTEMS SIMULATION AND 
SCIENTIFIC COMPUTING 813 (2008). 
152. Dean S. Hartley III, Verification & Validation in Military Simulations, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE 1997 WINTER SIMULATION CONFERENCE 925 (Sigrun Andradóttir et al. eds., 
1997). 
153. BEN H. THACKER ET AL., CONCEPTS OF MODEL VERIFICATION AND VALIDA-
TION 2 (Charmian Schalle ed., 2004); Hartley III, supra note 152; DEFENSE INNOVATION 
BOARD, supra note 27, at 47. 













perform its intended functions in its intended environment.155 It aims to 
demonstrate “the feasibility of conceptual approaches, evaluate design risk, 
identify design alternatives, compare and analyze tradeoffs, and estimate sat-
isfaction of operational requirements.”156 The phase covers both the devel-
opment stage of the system as well as the operational one, in which the de-
velopers investigate the system’s operational effectiveness, suitability, and 
survivability. According to the U.S. DoD,  
 
test and evaluation shall be structured to provide essential information to 
decision makers, assess attainment of technical performance parameters, 
and determine whether systems are operationally effective, suitable, surviv-
able, and safe for intended use. The conduct of test and evaluation, inte-
grated with modeling and simulation, shall facilitate learning, assess tech-
nology maturity and interoperability, facilitate integration into fielded 
forces, and confirm performance against documented capability needs and 
adversary capabilities as described in the system threat assessment.157  
 
When it comes to AI systems operating through machine learning, the 
T&E is directly linked to the system training process. Most of the algorithms 
learn thanks to two sets of data. On the one hand, the training data set is fed 
to the algorithm. On the other hand, the testing data set allows the developer 
to test and evaluate what the algorithm has learned.158 
States’ efforts towards integrating autonomy within their military capa-
bilities lead them to focus on the above-mentioned processes. In fact, one 
of the major obstacles to increasing military autonomy is the lack of suitable 
V&V methods for AI. Given the deterministic nature of model-based AI 
systems, current techniques for verifying and validating can be easily applied 
thereto.159 The same holds true for machine learning with offline capabilities. 
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Once trained, the system’s learning capabilities are frozen, and the algorithm 
does not receive any more inputs nor change its structure. Although it might 
not be easy to analyze the results and identify appropriate use cases to test 
the system, conventional V&V approaches remain valid and applicable.160 
For machine learning with online learning capabilities, verification becomes 
more complex due to the non-deterministic and adaptive nature of such al-
gorithms. It might be impossible to verify every version of a machine learn-
ing system (weapon or not) given its potential continuous change.161  
This challenge has not gone unnoticed by States that intend to leverage 
AI’s potential. The United States highlights that the lack of appropriate V&V 
methods and effective T&E of autonomous systems “prevents all but rela-
tively low levels of autonomy from being certified for use.”162 This under-
lines the need for States to develop mechanisms of V&V of AI that ensure 
the systems can be trusted.163 Confronted with this challenge, experts are 
working on identifying methods to conduct effective verification of machine 
learning systems. One suggestion that is gaining growing consensus is to 
conduct “runtime verifications” on online machine learning systems in order 
to keep up with the system adaptations to the environment.164 This would 
shift the focus toward a continuous evaluation during the full life cycle of 
the system, first and foremost the operational phase. The system would be 
certified prior to deployment to attest its suitability for use in a limited set of 
scenarios, while the incompleteness of the processes and potential unin-
tended scenarios would be acknowledged. Developers should then continu-
ously monitor performance and report to regulators to allow re-evaluation 
and take corrective measures if necessary.  
By doing so, the system is assessed in real operating conditions, and vi-
olations of its properties and specifications are detected and addressed while 
the system is running. It would also solve two problems at the same time. 
First, continuous verification during system operation would ensure that alt-
hough its unpredictability is accepted, this would not lead to violations of 
the system’s specifications and applicable law. Second, it would provide 
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those responsible for system functioning with a tool to retain control over 
it. This is relevant from an operational standpoint since no commander 
would entrust a system operating outside its sphere of control with critical 
functions. Yet there is a nuance: although runtime verification can be suited 
to machine learning with online capabilities, to date it can be effectively ap-
plied only when it is possible to specify criteria to constrain a machine learn-
ing adaptive system.165  
Further options are variants of a verification method known as “model 
checking.”166 Model checking is an algorithmic (fully automated) method for 
determining if a model of a system satisfies a correctness specification or 
property.167 In order to determine whether the specification is satisfied, 
model checking allows the developer to undertake an exhaustive exploration 
of a system’s achievable states, that is, all the possible executions of the sys-
tem. If a state that violates a correctness property is found, a counter-exam-
ple is produced to demonstrate the error.168 The problem with this verifica-
tion technique is that it is applicable only to finite-state systems,169 whereas 
the number of states in machine learning systems, particularly those working 
through deep neural networks, is enormous, if not infinite.170 In such a case, 
traditional model checking would be unsuited because it is impossible to ex-
plore all possible states and transitions of the system. Therefore, experts have 
proposed techniques to make model checking suitable to nonfinite state 
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models that would allow the verification of machine learning with adaptive 
functions.171 Yet, it is worth mentioning that to date these new approaches 
to model checking and runtime verification remain fields of research in the 
early phases of real-life validation.172  
Certainly, effective verification of machine learning would benefit from 
increasing the system’s explainability. Explainable AI has been specifically 
identified as a way to overcome the problem of the “black box” and related 
unpredictability of machine learning. Explainable AI enables AI systems to 
give explanations for their outcome or prediction that are understandable by 
humans. It enables users to “understand, appropriately trust, and effectively 
manage the emerging generation of artificially intelligent partners” without 
giving up the system’s accuracy.173 This facilitates verification since runtime 
verification could focus on these explanations as indicators of certain prop-
erties of the system.174 So far, however, explainable AI also remains a subject 
of research, and its level of adoption limited. 
This leads to another important aspect to consider, namely the need to 
automate the process of verifying the system’s robustness. Originally, soft-
ware certification was mostly manual and conducted by humans. Nowadays, 
verification processes can benefit from the support of automation. Manual 
certification mechanisms, besides being time consuming and costly, can re-
sult in fouled evaluations because reviewers introduce their own sets of ex-
pertise, experiences, and biases. Hence, DARPA developed an automated 
rapid software certification program to allow an automatic assessment of 
software evidence. This permits certifiers to rapidly determine that the 
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system risk is acceptable and move away from document-based engineering 
processes.175 
This state-of-the-art assessment, along with foreseeable developments in 
AI certification, indicates that the solutions to the predictability problem are 
found in the technical field, not the legal. This, however, is indicative of a 
fundamental consequence for the legal review of AI-driven systems: the 
technical and legal assessment conflate into one single assessment—the legal 
review becomes congruent with V&V. Traditionally, V&V procedures are 
separate from, though functional with, legal reviews.176 The U.S. DoD di-
rective “The Defense Acquisition System,” for instance, examines the tech-
nical and legal assessments as two distinct steps of the weapon and system 
acquisition process.177 Weapon testing and technical assessment provide em-
pirical evidence of the weapon performance on which militaries and legal 
experts can base their legal review.178 Data supporting the review include the 
results of any tests on weapon accuracy, reliability, performance, wounds, 
failure rates, or other relevant matters.179  
Yet, for AI systems, technical verification can work as both a technical 
and legal assessment. The reason is that, as discussed above, targeting law is 
transformed into technical parameters and embedded into the system during 
the designing phase. Once the legal standards are learned by the system, 
compliance with those standards is a technical task. Regarding the verifica-
tion process—namely ensuring that the system matches the developer’s con-
ceptual description and specifications—verifying an AI weapon system al-
lows the State to check whether the system matches technical specifications 
regarding targeting law. Likewise, concerning validation, the assessment of 
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whether an AI system meets the needs of those utilizing it allows the State 
to assess the system regarding its expected use, duly considering the envi-
ronment in which it is to be deployed. These two steps indeed satisfy all that 
IHL requires from legal reviews of weapons and means of warfare. Accord-
ingly, the V&V and legal review become one. 
A practical consequence of this is that legal knowledge and experience 
will need to be integrated with technical expertise in the V&V process. First, 
this should entail the participation of legal experts in the V&V procedure 
concerning data selection, as observed above. Technical experts could over-
see the procedures, whereas legal experts would assess whether the behaviors 
and outcomes observed during such phases are compliant with targeting law. 
To this end, the peer review mechanism established in the United States as 
part of the V&V process180 could serve as a basis for such integration of legal 
expertise. This is also in line with the collegiality principle already existing in 
some legal review committees, which intends to include every necessary ex-
pertise for the assessment of the lawfulness of a weapon.181 Second, cross-
fertilization between legal and technical spheres implies that V&V experts 
need to be familiar with the legal principles and rules applicable to targeting, 
at least those regulating the system’s tasks. Likewise, legal experts would need 
a basic understanding of the technology and technological issues involved.182 
This would compensate for lawyers’ potential lack of understanding of the 
underlying technology, which may arise with complex AI systems.183 Ulti-
mately, this reciprocal exchange of knowledge would allow bridge-building 
and favor understanding and cooperation between the technical and legal 
sphere. Such an integrated process would reflect the holistic (technical and 
legal) assessment that such systems require.  
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VIII. EMERGING POLICY GUIDANCE  
 
There is no international guidance on how to best conduct V&V and legal 
reviews of AI-driven systems. Yet, over the last years, governmental agencies 
and private companies have started to elaborate “normative guideposts” re-
garding safe and ethical development and use of AI systems. While they do 
not directly apply to V&V and legal reviews, it is interesting that they address 
the same or similar issues and challenges as identified and discussed above 
with regard to ensuring IHL compliant use of AI systems. As such, these 
emerging policies and related work can serve as inputs for the reflection on 
the development of future guidance for conducting V&V, including legal 
assessment, of military AI systems.  
As of September 2019, 84 documents containing ethical principles or 
guidelines for AI have been issued worldwide by the public and private sec-
tor.184 More recently, the European Union Commission has adopted its own 
guidance on AI.185 In October 2019, the U.S. DoD adopted the first policy 
guidance directly addressing military AI. The “AI Principles: Recommenda-
tions on the Ethical Use of Artificial Intelligence” establishes the five prin-
ciples of responsibility, equitability, traceability, reliability, and governabil-
ity.186 Interestingly, these principles have a lot of commonalities with other 
emerging guidance. Indeed, there are certain overarching principles among 
the guiding documents, namely transparency, justice and fairness, non-ma-
leficence, responsibility, and privacy.187  
Transparency refers to the possibility of describing, inspecting, and re-
producing the mechanisms through which decisions are made, how learning 
and adaptation to the environment occur and how data is governed.188 This 
requires that the system has specific technical qualities for it to be defined as 
transparent, such as the ability to give reasons for its actions 
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(“explainability”).189 Transparency can help investigations into AI actions, as 
it would enable humans to retrace the decision steps and interactions with 
the environment that caused the result, understand what occurred, and make 
sure similar errors or violations would no longer happen. When such systems 
undertake targeting functions or contribute to such processes, transparency 
is an essential prerequisite from an IHL perspective. Notably, for obligations 
of conduct, such as the principles of proportionality or precaution, which 
require balancing between different values and the execution of feasible 
measures in given circumstances, transparency enables a reviewer to access 
the process that led to a specific output; allows the reviewer to assess it in 
light of those obligations; and, in instances of violations, enables the attrib-
ution of responsibility.190 If defined as a mandatory parameter to fulfill, an 
AI system’s level of transparency would need to be assessed during its V&V. 
Another common trait of the guidelines is a focus on the reliability of 
the AI system, i.e., whether the system appropriately, safely, and robustly 
acts within its domain.191 This implies verifying whether the system responds 
safely to unanticipated situations and does not evolve in ways that are incon-
sistent with the original expectations.192 In particular, “safety” refers to “free-
dom from risk which is not tolerable,”193 where the notion of freedom stands 
for a low probability of occurrence of non-tolerable consequences.194 This 
directly links to the above discussions on acceptable levels of system predict-
ability as a parameter to be assessed in the V&V process. Similarly, 
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“robustness” means that an AI system is capable of recognizing and behav-
ing correctly when exposed to different scenarios compared to those in 
which it was trained.195 Also, AI systems must be able to “adequately deal 
with errors or inconsistencies during all life cycle phases,” and they should 
be resilient against attacks and attempts to manipulate data and algorithms.196  
A further common feature in recent policies is the requirement that the 
system is not biased, i.e., that the system is fair or equitable.197 The non-
discriminatory nature of the system’s outcomes may be verified during the 
certification stage. As discussed above, since the requirement is tightly linked 
to data, some guidelines advise to ensure during the training phase that the 
data fed into the system is non-biased.198  
Guidelines also seek to ensure some degree of human control over AI 
systems. The U.S. DoD establishes that humans should remain responsible 
for the development, deployment, use, and outcomes of such a system.199 
Similarly, the EU white paper on AI lists human oversight as necessary for 
high-risk AI applications, suggesting this would help to prevent the system 
from causing adverse effects.200 According to the white paper, human over-
sight can consist of (1) revision and validation of the AI output by a human 
before it becomes effective; (2) revision and validation of the outcome after 
it becomes effective; (3) real-time monitoring of the system while operating 
along with the ability to intervene and deactivate the system; and (4) impos-
ing operational constraints on AI systems during the design phase.201 How 
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to configure human-machine interaction remains intensively debated.202 
Once the necessary level of human control is defined, it becomes a relevant 
parameter for testing, verifying, and validating AI systems. Depending on 
the defined degree and type of control, the assessment most likely would 
need to focus on the human-machine teaming rather than focusing on the 
system only. This would allow an ideal evaluation of the human-machine 
integration, including the humans’ reliance and dependability on the system. 
Although these principles are not legally binding and mostly still to be 
further developed at this stage, their operationalization may offer valuable 
indicators for experts and lawyers concerned with verifying AI systems for 
their proper use. Indeed, they may serve both to help achieve the above dis-
cussed technical, operational, and legal requirements for the use of military 
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AI systems, as well as offer additional elements States may wish to consider.  
For instance, many private initiatives, such as the IEEE,203 are currently 
working on how to translate them into technical standards, which would al-
low safety and ethical principles to be effectively reflected in an AI system’s 
functioning. Indeed, each of the principles can be linked to some methodol-
ogies, techniques, or more precise standards, which may guide an AI system’s 
certification in terms of techniques to adopt and parameters to assess. It is 
noteworthy, however, that these principles currently remain aspirational as 
it is practically impossible to fulfill them all. A tradeoff between some of 
these principles also exists, whereby implementing one may imply renounc-
ing (or, at least, partially renouncing) the implementation of another.204 
In any case, the military use of AI requires further efforts to develop 
guidance for effectively evaluating and authorizing their use. States can do 
this both nationally and through international cooperation. This is in line 
with calls for good practices by the United States and the Group of Govern-
mental Experts on LAWS, among others.205 As the private sector continues 
to be progressive in developing implementable guidance for civil applica-
tions for AI, defense agencies may take inspiration and borrow insights. This 
could pave the way for a common understanding of what is required of AI 




With the emergence of military AI technology, the international legal frame-
work needs to be digitalized. Regarding AI-enabled weapon systems, further 
research is required on how AI can effectively operationalize IHL. Yet the 
technology brings more than this to the legal regime on weapons. Rather 
than being just a military tool to be assessed according to Article 36 API and 
the respective customary international law rule, AI’s features are such that 
targeting law needs to be integrated, and the system needs training in IHL 
based on data. The IHL rules to be verified for compliance by the weapon 
system are thus expanded during the legal assessment. This assessment must 
be done at an earlier stage in comparison to traditional weapon systems. 
                                                                                                                      
203. See, e.g., notably, IEEE ETHICS IN ACTION IN AUTONOMOUS AND INTELLIGENT 
SYSTEMS, IEEE, https://ethicsinaction.ieee.org/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2021).  
204. Telephone Interview with Ricardo Chavarriaga, Head, Office of the Confederation 
of the Laboratories for Artificial Intelligence Research in Europe (Nov. 11, 2020). 












Yet, the characteristics of AI technology fundamentally alter the legal 
assessment. As this technology is digital, the legal parameters need to be in-
tegrated and absorbed by the algorithm. Consequently, the legal review needs 
to assess its technical functioning as an algorithm. The evaluation of whether 
the system operates in accordance with its technical specifications can thus 
include the conformity with legal requirements. Hence, the legal review can 
be integrated into the V&V process of the AI system. The legal review 
thereby conflates with the technical process of V&V.  
The comprehensive nature of such an assessment of AI systems leads to 
a two-fold consequence. First, legal advisors and technical experts need to 
cooperate during the testing and verification procedure of AI systems to en-
sure that the system correctly reflects its specifications and thus operates in 
accordance with IHL. For machine learning techniques, this includes the 
participation of legal advisors during data selection. Second, it implies that 
the predictability problem needs to be solved at the technical and operational 
level. This requires predetermining levels of predictability for each system 
and operational environment that indicate the acceptable level of risk that a 
given system might not comply with the applicable rules. This would reflect 
a new parameter against which to assess an AI system as a precondition for 
respecting IHL.  
The law on legal reviews of weapons, in particular Article 36 API and 
the applicable customary international law norm, does not need to change. 
Article 36 API’s formulation allows the adaption of State practice to the 
characteristics and challenges of the new technologies. As the rapid devel-
opment of AI systems and lawyers’ understanding of these technologies only 
began recently, further research, debate, and practical guidelines regarding 
the legal review of algorithms are necessary. Standards will need to be devel-
oped to define actionable directives on how to verify such systems for their 
safety and legality. Emerging guidelines regarding the development and use 
of AI, as well as respective initiatives from the private sector can inform such 
work.  
The most significant implication of the emerging AI technologies regard-
ing legal reviews is that they increase the overall importance of such reviews 
as mechanisms to ensure compliance with IHL. The more humans delegate 
crucial tasks to autonomous systems, the more the V&V and legal reviews 
become the essential gatekeeper for IHL compliance. The burden falls not 
only on legal advisers but also technical experts, as only together can they 












legal reviews are rigorously conducted if they are to fulfill their promise of 
preventing IHL violations by new technologies. 
 
